Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting Technology by Hoke, Candice
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
Summer 2012 
Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting 
Technology 
Candice Hoke 
Cleveland State University, s.hoke@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Election Law Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Publisher's Statement 
With permission of Case Western Reserve Law Review - http://law.case.edu/journals/lawreview/
Home.aspx 
Original Citation 
S. Candice Hoke, Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting Technology, 62 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 997 (2011-2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
Citation: 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 997 2011-2012 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Sun Nov  3 14:56:05 2013
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   


















.s capacity to aci
5, and function r(
e[ grave oeately record
relate to the right to vot
Law, Cleveland State University; Foun
J Project Director of the Public Monitor q











































-se studies, the California T
ect EVEREST assessment,
ms in nationwide deployr
:onfirm prior studies' fini
he voting equipment used by
cialists and computer scie
wed articles and held confer
e two studies, 4 rather surpris





















ich card voting inadequacies
'he scholarly muteness also































Electio n law scholars recogn
offer rich opportuniti
rally insulating incumt
18s such, they pose seriof popular sovereignty
a hypothetically ideal
remained uncorrected,































aming and tools for
gful election contests.
constitutional promise
;sues were resolved in
echnlogystatus quo
regated right to vote
elections potentially























legal scholarsquestions. 12 Bul
not only wheth
the deployed tei
cure 13 for Flori
more serious le
The Suprelr
























e Court has E
s including the
ed as they were
s ballot box-sti




























D have vote cho-ices correctl~y
d correctly reported in the final
es repeatedly underscore these
to vote, 15 these cases and their
e in lower court opinions
iency of challenged e-voting
correction, and the principles
)plying the correct standard of
ring systems and operating
electronic ballot box-stuffing,



























Part 11 considers th
legal import of tt
adjudicating the st








f the dispute over th
properly derived fror
aningful voting rig


































rt I traces il
ive, definiti-v
from actual
rights and election I
s far to understand
voting systems W




























in response to Bumn v.
ress passed the Help
Its statutory standards r(
lloting errors before cast
ent of existin4 votin4 deA
oting. "' Most states
004-05 after receiv
lonies designed to i
ssessments of the sof
lqpomc, fhnt wer e, r




















studies and offers so
documented flaws affect
A. The Comprehen
004. In 2007, after the
icies, the California and C
Live, multi-system studie
ientists and other expert L
.y reviews the findings iir
)me illustrative example
real elections.
Fsive, Definitive Voting Sysi
HAVA provided subs
place their existing pur
quired new systems to s













































ronic ("DRE") machines that normally offer a toi




lots) or copied to
























coding error s (Sol






















erslty ot alltormla short




















































instructions to a computer tna
ions to perform, their order of opera



















require the systems' designs
self-reporting of errors, and al






button" or an ON
aanly
,ion or
)ices. Thne voter s selections
interactions into records kep
er copied and interpreted b3
[timately reported as ca
language. Computer
it election officials an(





so protections for the a
































mity and secrecy of
g errors and engin(
regard to perfor












)f all systems lacked ba
is ialed1to tollo
design principles. All systems were su
be introduced from a number of vectorL
memory cards. These design defec
thousands) of different opportunities i
programming code that would "fi]
scramble tabulation data, delete voting











tecting audit logs so th
ty. In the election cot
ionitoring of all tabulat























y, including any effort
es that voting systems
plying details of the
happens to rem,,Ported the pr
/01





















ed features. 9 Perhaps not surprisingly, thi
ring systems' logs that recorded operator
industry standard design protections to prc
;entional overwriting or erasure. 40 In a bc
-onstitute records that will "report" atteml









e studies found thatactivity had failed to
cvent their accidental
anking environment,
pts to transfer funds
In tho r dtino nrinq
.otivated "insiders" could
n erase the log inventories
and activity ins
,."ould be used to differ
iUyce ioU eLiUs UUUUCL.




system to be cor




ds. 42 Although ve
y easy bypassing of passwords.
ed in each system that easily permi
Ipromised in way,curate election re
so included an e
;sing all three vot-
lor
dany oercd the voting
col prc
-or any re(
ing systems for their
al disabilities or alter
















































DRE systems could not
tieS. 43 For instance, phys
ommodc
uals could often not be achieved because of
)allot functions for visually impaired voters
target voters. The authors concluded that
ity requirements of current law and none
in test voting by persons with a range of
anguage needs. ' 46 The California Secretary
nandating many managerial and technical
-,s as a condition of their continued use.
41
te DREs are widely deployed nationwide
hey satisfy requirements for "accessible"
legal question may be why no litigation or
)roceedings have occurred elsewhere.
legal underpinnings is a task needing the
iw scholars concerned with underserved
the TTBR reports in August, the Ohio
-ced, with most work occurring during the
Jology differed somewhat in that the state
..-possilme impr
)e taken by pol
)TECT1
-ontract convened three s(






laboratory. - One ki
-ion of the ES&S vc
security consulting
.ored
tall on each criterion.-'
Like the TTBR, EVERES'




























































curs, or to knoi
tected. ' '
EVEREST and
























































vity logs could easily be forged or erased
activity was "intended to be monitor[ed],"
that "it is difficult to know when an attack
o isolate or recover from it when it is
bus clarified and reinforced four critical
Lg the legal sufficiency of deployed voting
g systems that are in wide deployment
th software design and coding errors that
loss, miscounts, or other voting device
is, they can function in an arbitrary and
demonstrable evidence of such errors.58
is pervasively provide opportunities for
ng with all aspects of an election's
ibulation reports of winners and losers;
achieved by remote connections .59 Third,
at and relatively complete ways for a
er one's tracks by deleting or modifying
providing a relatively effective cover for
th, mitigations cannot be devised to
e opportunities to tamper; the failure of
outset cannot be overcome by managerial
deployed voting system software has not
not consistently and reliably achieve high
finds additional support from the "twelve-














systems fell well b
oncluded Premier ay
emier and Hart Inter(
elve basic best pract,






discovered that all of the
engineering expectations.
"scored a 'zero,' that is,
ms "failed to meet any of
)561 ES&S scored one out
with Imncwleore, nf bcCth
ring standards and the tools for diagnoe
-d in comprehensive evaluations of elec
stems; they have co-u
out other correction
s are unfit for voting.










of the studied systems pos
ter] insufficient to guaran
ions underscore that the v(
tially or grossly inaccurate
vertent errors at (













ity mechanisms provided fore to ensure accuracy and
le systems that provide those
,,archers' ultimate conclusion
;sess critical security failures
lee a trustworthy election."
65
,ote totals may be accurate-







ials) sought to dismisc
ory tower laboratory
As the next sectio




















erson for the Premier/
e..that there has nc
ic voting system, in (
rcial Calls Machines f
'dors and many electii
.As just one exampli
iReform (appointed'
rs did not disclose
,-ly included clause
ion databases and I
etary ownership ol























t0 an iron cover ot co
gation of anomalies a
itened lawsuits against
for violation of alle
e election officials silr
m ambiguous or quest
se the clauses to elimir
xrately in real elec
tms of product d


















to ascertain the corrbulation reports. 69 T


























Lask, media reports ha
-entation of flawed perforr
B. Field Experience of
latively unknown by the
ical record demonstrates t
rtely pr dicted the inabili
ly in generating consistent
as have produced negativ
te at the polls, 73 and penr
lates to bubbles or butt
en candidates. 7 Withou
as have, for instance, coul
)le times76 or produced vi




hat the TTBR and
Ity of the voting s-
tly accurate tallies.







































ars renerate a voter-
is are not tbolprool
I tabulating softwar DI
r ballot
onprofit study reported
torical evidence of scanner miscounts, rc
y ballot-scanner systems are rarely verified
he miscounts described [in
,vents] were detected by
scanners produced implau
erroneous results were ce
plausible and the error
-ertification. 
7






















is are designed to
ed ot
Mlill particular hierarchies o1tide-off some capacities to
operational contexts do not
cal need for high assullrance
ocess vot
I reliability. But Election Do
iscribed opportunities where
eable for the voters; it must
ccuratelv duriny the limited th
or those votes may be lost a
and EVEREST produced t
o whether fundamental vo








injit jotngn conjiaence in it




























the entire election processes culmin0able to provide ssured acco ntab
unctioned normally-accurately-in
hus, in 2007, an array of the most
urier science and voting systems s(
ment that determines whether fun
[led offers vast reasons not to trusl
)ment produces. Further, breachi
mation systems design where datc
al objectives, the equipment doc
ronic self-reporting on core perforn
)ment has operated as intended in a
ranting ballots from all precincts. 8' T
the software industry's engineerin
iosing anomalies have counseled th
without other corrections and qua
iines are unfit for voting..engineering assessments of a comi
























ing in a cast votes report
'7 for whether the profection operations. 80
idely respected experts
ware informed us that t]
ental rights to vote willI
he election outcomes tf
,r the basic precepts
not provide trustworthy
%e, including whether the
ating votes to candidates
e with vast knowledge of
mdards and the tools for





compliance with thn safety, the F ederc

































nents de orthv. In
ough both voting and aviation require qu
)achieve accuracy in operations, no federal agenc
issue analogous judgments and orders regarding
inadequacy of voting systems. Further, under
les governing flight performance data recorder
ircraft, by design and operation the data recorders
-the aircraft carrier's control, from the pilot's influe
m horrific crash disasters. 84 The information syst
r data recording systems worthy of trust c
challenging physical conditions, such as thosc
iters, and could do so for voting systems but
3R and EVEREST assessors reported that the vc
ot implement auditing designs that warrant trust i
luipment's output.
The third core conclusion




)ssess critical security failur
iarantee a trustworthy el
)nsiderations for election la
lowed numerous secret me
Ndors, vendor personnel
ection office staff, poll wort
0uivalent of bal ot box stu
)
tOI
hie SClentIilC Studiles reached ils equal])f the deployed e-voting systems hal
tilized pathways for motivated insidei
a trace. 85 The EVEREST academ
a stressed: "All of the studied systerr
s that render [them] ... insufficient t
ction. , 86 Translated into tradition,,
V, the deployed e-voting systems hav
hods for dishonest or highly partisa
(including software programmers
nrs or voters to engage in the electron]
ing8' and to erase any tracks back t
(FDR)#Principles_ofOpe
;he most crash survivable r










invite tampering, such as including a "(
adit logging of operator actions insid



















e TTBR and EV
considers to be





































































tate and local governn
rrently deployed precir
,pressing state govern_
ballots on their propri
approved Internet rot
S93 despite the con
























I.pnp .qlSt=typeegtype=2,)ersonnel division of the
t voting for military and
ssential Research Neede
.d Local Levels (Oct.
139issrn.1697848.
and cryptography expe
et have the necessary t(
1, Will Online Voting Tz
.time. comn/time/Printout/






aot engineered for secure d(
security, voted ballots cannot
is the remote absentee voter in
















































Ystems an coi-d ballots throuj
cannot offer confidence that the
falsification thus to be counted
systems. Unfortunately, thus far r








of elections vulnerable to










)ncepts and categories rc
ote dilution" 106 or failure
Professor Richard Hasei
political science as the prol
fields' profuse scholarship
redistricting. ' rIn order for
voting systems to guide vot
perhaps the time has come
recognized "parens" of elei
technology adequacy to rec-
popular sovereignty, it appc
the computer science and in

































ntitled constitutional law and
f election law in light of these
rights, campaign finance, and
facts about currently deployed
logy policy and adjudication, 
°
0
[on law scholars to enlarge the
Given the centrality of voting
fullness of voting rights and
ue for election law to embrace
L security fields' °9 as a co-equal
dued aunt or uncle-of election
research methodologies have
uable heuristics relevant to the
Aring technologies. For instance,researchers were able to study
nd voting technologies, and to
hnic minority groups generally























, * r- A I
)TECT1
ermitted
ion could then successfully challenge particul
legally insufficient for underserved minori
ition. 112
.ence, however, has not supplied sufficient




.al science methods or "lenses."
may be that information syste
prey to the supposed dichoto
,en assuring voter "access" or
%ount. 114 Since one's position or
been viewed as code for politi











curity subfield of computer
r lenses as it were-for
hnological flaws that relate
rely invisible if usinu only
ty concerns have








































tegrlty :1 concerns ma,.election law scholars




"availability" for use as
"integrity"-the last of whic
trustworthiness of the data."
'I
concerned with the voting e
casting ballots, and hence to t
Classifying the voting sy
relating only to "integrity" is
field's core concerns for a(
equipment, embracing reliabi
a claim is made that the se(
grave miscommunication oc
"integrity" differs in depth ar
political science has yet grast
Properly characterized in
comprehends, for instance t
rights, vote dilution, and ba
presented by all-electronic,
effectively redressed by the
focused on all-electronic DR
capable of flawed tabulatic







ertise, though, the (






oth the correctness and the
security is therefore deeply

















-two ways. It e)
.tive use of the
access. AdditioE


















its 120 and state courts
land, 124 Georgia,12' a
the debate has also been frame























endment 'or the siat
of how the claims
nst the plaintiffs chosi
isulated the pre-exis










ihat of an exemplai
itial "arbitrary and
for the plaintiffs. A
ghly experienced cyl



























x~een the two fic
ntials as a comlp
inuch nonetheless
-en testified to
,ss DREs that lac



















































to me hstoric security
that the introduction of
choices extrinsic to th
p~roblems rather than cu
largely contradicting his Mar y
The most recent DRE dec'
2011 , was predicated on stat
NAACP of Austin and indivi
of State's "failure to require












S with paper ballots, explicily Opll
iditable permanent record of the vot
ig machine would increase the secu
gland testimony. 03
ision, from the Texas Supreme Cour
te statutory and constitutional law. '
dual plaintiffs claimed that the Secret
a contemporaneous paper record of
statutory right to a recount and an au
nal guarantees of equal protection,
he right of suffrage. 2 While the C(
their equal protection claims, it choL;








































v. Shelley, a case decided in 200
Ac assessments of voting systems.
oewed DREs to offer some signi
,es of voters though also presenting
ssor Dan Tokaji's approach of perc(
in an undiluted ballot to be of
ereas the supposed DRE access
bled voters were concrete improve
. To the degree these two sets of cor
tension, 13' Tokaj i and the Texas
lion objective of superior importa
gal scrutiny, the court concluded I
.voting technologies to the regu
c all of the sclentlt
the Texas court v








erceived to be in
red the accommoda
iighly deferential le
efer the choice of
as of the Texas Secre
court's perception














































indng ot nhow cor





















)REs or any othe
ronly. "' Field b
,ssible voting ei
'oters.




challenges to Ohio's voting technologyadministrative system, 13 9 and, most rece
of rules governing the invalidation of
opinion displays a keen understandiln
crucial role in ensuring that state poll
























t has issued opi
d substantive dt












fors do not st
fit in systemat
al actors to de
uit recognize,,;
Smeaningful
er a voted bal
has occurred.



















































he ballot, the Cour
Srather than to mer
,1 nrm C
ing standard of rev
fhe Supreme Court











characterized the right tc
because preservative of Al
observed, "No right is m(
involves 'matters close to
The Court has also stress
-rutin o
"on(,







:) vote as a "fundamental pol
11 rights."10' Almost a century 
ore precious than the right of
the core of our constitutional



















the most basic, are l1usori
a the relative importance
otes not be diluted or del
0 0ion o1: those wo
if the right to vote 1
of voting rights and







rights, a substantive due proc
Sixth Circuit affirmed that
recording stated a violation o
unfair as to deny or severely
vote. 112 It ruled: "[i]f the elec-






aken to reduce thes



















se risks to voting
available. "' The
-s in DRE vote
ise if sufficiently
lamental right to
ches the point of
the due process
o well beyond
ig and marking ot- ballots. :7
e defendant State officers
iolations where state emp
.d that lack of training has (
.ted with "deliberate indiff
While these judicial approaches are well designed for protectithe right to vote and popular sovereignty from serious struc
dangers posed by misunderstood information technologies, tl









threats to our s,
under the same stand,
0st be counted, or evei
to be listed on the bc
I but ti
of popu sovereign
ds as whether votes or writ
whether third parties have ba
lot, do not compare. One m










inologles pose to ti












I have concluded that th
)be correct or to prodi
ny of the mo,,;
with preemniner





































documented chain of custody combined
conducted by appropriate statistical parametc
check and deterrence.1
57














When faced with e
id EVEREST, Gerr
-ectronic vote recordi
n wnemer me vounlot, permit a recou
can be feasibly prot
ic pulses. Additiona






eJecting the Bundestag (national I
systemic protections of democracy
popular sovereignty. The court ru















able where state governm
yet deploy these highl
vote counts.
0lar to that provided in t
stitutional Court ruled



















dure in whichthe voter cannot rellabl
ier his or her vote is unfalsifiably recorde
e ascertainment of the election result, an
rs cast are assigned and counted, exclud
of the election procedure from publ
constitutional requirements. "
The court rejected as constituti
expert opinion to pronounce whe
software was correct rather that
stressed "the voter himself or
without a more detailed knowledl
Additionally, the Constitutio
voter is informed by an electroni
been registered, constitutionc,
verification have not been achic
critical role of public transparenc
legitimacy of the elections," so t











been included in tt








al Court held th,


















e assured. 162 "Every citizen must
-ps of the election without an)
Irespect the announced electoral r(
,ncy includes the counting of votes
s, in which the voter cannot und
er his vote is recorded unaltered,
te counting of votes, nor how th
en accumulated and counted, e)
of assured public verification.


























ad its legitimacy as a
sed, publicly transpar
executive and legisl
Jt in new ter'hnnlnoi
oapable f inaccuracy and covert n
irticulated clear principles of co
he new threats posed to conte
Jenign information technologies.
Zitizens is whether our courts will
ound manner to protect popula
impending questions concerning t

















The national effort to upgra
fhe right to vote has produced
vote rate and more modestly ii
griven the definitive voting tc
2007, corrective responses are
.oncerned, governments are r
Zare. That high standard ha
orovernments who continue t
tems, nor by most,(Lgation is not a first
ocates of recounabl
sistent misunderstand:
dings may leave no alb,
More than ever, elec
'ficient computer secui
licators of dangerous n
understood and promr
)er threats all governm



















































































rotecting constitutional voting rights from well-intended
nisunderstood technical innovations. 165
165 Information system technologies pose a broad array of risks to constitutional righ
ialues. See generally CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (J
osen & Benjamin Wittes, eds. 2011) (exploring the impact of new technologies on pr
provide a 00rime exam0l
)TECT1
6.DD{

